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HOW AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION AFFIRMED FREEDOM
OF SPEECH EVEN BEFORE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AKHIL REED AMAR*
In this essay, I hope to say a little something about both constitutional
substance and constitutional method.
Substantively, I shall try to bring into view a heretofore hidden
argument in support of the constitutional right of Americans to engage in a
robust, wide-open, virtually uncensored conversation about government
and society-a conversation in which participants may let fly scathing
criticisms (and tart defenses, for that matter) of the status quo.
Methodologically, I hope to show how this hidden argument travels
through a recognizable version of standard originalism, but with some
interesting twists.
I. STANDARD "PROOFS" OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Let us begin by reviewing several standard legal arguments in support
of a robust right of free expression. As Professor Philip Bobbitt has
shown, American lawyers and judges assess constitutional propositions by
deploying certain well-established "modalities" of legal argument and
analysis.' Text, history, structure, and precedent-these are some of the
basic tools in the constitutional lawyer's kit. Lawyers use these modalities
to evaluate the legal strength of various claims made about constitutional
meaning.
Take judicial precedent, the foundation of what Bobbitt labels the
"doctrinal" modality. Doctrine provides strong support for a constitutional
right to criticize government policy, even when such criticism includes
extreme invective and strays from factual accuracy. This right lies at the
heart of one of the most celebrated Supreme Court cases of the last
century, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 In ringing language, the
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Sullivan Court proclaimed that our nation has a "profound... commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."3  According to Sullivan, a citizen criticizing government
officials may never be criminally punished or held liable in a civil suit
merely because that citizen's denunciations contained careless falsehoods.4
Coming closer to home, consider the Supreme Court case that
Professor Susan Gilles discussed in some detail, Brandenburg v. Ohio,5 a
case that turned forty years old this year and that arose in Ohio.6 In
Brandenburg, the Court made clear that even citizen speech publicly
advocating illegal violence merits a strong measure of constitutional
protection and cannot ordinarily be prohibited "except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.",
7
Doctrinal protection for robust free expression-especially free
expression of political opinions-is thus rock-solid today. But if only
doctrine supported this right, we would be left with a puzzle. Before the
1920s, the Supreme Court had never invoked a constitutional right of free
expression to invalidate a state or federal law.8 On the contrary, several
notable Court cases in the early twentieth century upheld sweeping forms
of governmental censorship and suppression of citizen expression.9 (One
of these cases, Whitney v. California,1° was not explicitly overruled until
3Id. at 270.
4 See id. at 279-80 (holding that public officials must prove actual malice to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct).
5 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6 The case turned forty years old in 2009, the year this lecture and Professor Susan
Gilles's commentary were presented at Capital University Law School. Events giving rise
to the Brandenburg suit took place at a farm in Hamilton County, Ohio. Id. at 445.
71d. at 447.
s The rights of free expression first began to prevail in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927), Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.697
(1931). In retrospect, two other cases from the 1920s may also be seen as victories for free
expression. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
9 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); United States v. Schenck, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); United States v. Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S.616 (1919); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
0 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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Brandenburg,I I which also undermined the logic of several other early
cases.) If precedent were our only constitutional guide, we might be
inclined to think that the federal constitutional right to free expression
arose only in the twentieth century. We might even wonder about the
correctness of Sullivan or Brandenburg to the extent that these landmark
cases broke with prior case law.
However, when we turn from doctrine to consider other constitutional
modalities, we find strong additional support for a robust constitutional
right of political expression. For example, one modality directs our
attention to the very structure of our system of government. And our
system, based on popular sovereignty and free elections of public servants,
strongly suggests that government officials-both at the state and federal
level-lack the authority to prevent a robust public discourse critical of the
government itself and/or existing social structures. In America, the
sovereign people ultimately decide what policies we will support and
which public servants we will elect. These elections would not be truly
free if incumbents could entrench themselves against criticisms from
challengers. The people would not truly be sovereign if our agents and
servants-current government officials-could prevent us from speaking
freely amongst ourselves on all matters of collective concern. From the
perspective of constitutional structure, our public servants ultimately
answer to us and have no authority to tell us what to say or what to think,
politically.
Professor Vince Blasi has elegantly summarized this structural
argument:
[F]ree speech is considered to be an essential ingredient of
democratic self-government. In this view, ordinary
citizens are the true governors; officials are merely their
delegates. Citizens so invested with sovereign power have
a duty to bring independent, informed judgment to their
governing task. Persons under such a duty, the argument
goes, must be free to explore the full range of ideas
regarding government, even ideas that, were they to gain
any measure of legitimation, could only undermine the
commitments and projects of the current regime.1
2
"Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
12 Vincent Blasi, The Pessimist's Case for Free Speech, in SESQUICENTENNIAL ESSAYS
OF THE FACULTY OF COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 26, 26 (2008).
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Note that on this more structural view, a robust right of free expression
was indeed part of the Constitution long before Supreme Court majorities
saw the light. To the extent that early Court case law sided with self-
serving government agents attempting to entrench themselves in power and
muzzle their masters, the sovereign citizenry, the Justices simply goofed.
Historical arguments-another standard modality in the constitutional
kit-offer additional support for a robust constitutional right of free
political expression. During debates over the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution, a wide assortment of Federalists (including Roger
Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton,
James Wilson, Charles Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Noah
Webster, Hugh Williamson, and Richard Dobbs Spaight) sought to
reassure Anti-Federalist critics by insisting that the new federal
government would have no generally applicable enumerated power to
censor or license the press.' 3 In the mid-1790s, James Madison, who
himself had played a pivotal role in persuading the First Congress to
endorse a constitutional amendment explicitly affirming "freedom of
speech [and] of the press," explained the deep principle underlying that
amendment. Under the American system of popular sovereignty, "the
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people."' 4 Several generations later, in response to
aggressive governmental efforts to suppress abolitionist speech at both the
state and federal levels, a new political party took shape, and in the
presidential election of 1856, this party nominated John C. Fremont for
President. The campaign slogan that year made it evident to all what this
new Republican Party stood for: "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free
Labor, Free Territory, and Fremont.' ' 15 After the Civil War, Republicans
infused this free-speech vision into the Fourteenth Amendment, with
Congressman after Congressman in the mid-1860s making clear on Capitol
Hill that free political expression was one of the sacred "privileges" and
"immunities" of citizens that should never be abridged by any government,
state or federal.'
6
And let us not forget perhaps the most obvious constitutional argument
of all: the text of the First Amendment does explicitly guarantee "the
13 See AK"IL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36
(1998).
14 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (Nov. 27, 1794).
15 AMAR, supra note 13, at 235.
16 Id. at 231-46.
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freedom of speech [and] of the press." The word "speech" is particularly
notable because this word also appeared in the original Constitution-in
Article I, section 6, protecting congressional "Speech or Debate." This
Article I clause built on still-earlier protections of legislative free speech in
England and America. In 1689, the landmark English Bill of Rights
proclaimed, "That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in
parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place
out of parliament.' 7 In the early 1780s, the Articles of Confederation
echoed this idea: "Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be
impeached or questioned in any court, or place out of Congress.'
In all these texts-the English Bill of Rights, the Articles of
Confederation, and Article I, section 6-the central focus was not
commercial speech, artistic speech, or literary speech, but rather, political
speech. Parliament-from the French parler, to speak-is a speaking
spot.' 9 But it is the home of a particular kind of speech: political discourse.
So too with Congress. If a Senator takes the floor to advertise the low beer
prices at his liquormart, such commercial speech might be protected by a
broad reading of Article I, section 6-but surely we would say that it was
at the outer periphery of protection, as speech of distinctly lower
constitutional value.
Seen from this angle, the "freedom of speech" in the First Amendment
is likewise about political discourse at its core. It is a reminder that in
America, the people, not Congress, are sovereign. Our highest
Parliament--our most exalted parley place-is not confined by Capitol
walls. Under the Speech and Debate Clause, our servants in Congress may
criticize their political adversaries free from outside censorship;
symmetrically, under the other Speech Clause (the First Amendment), their
adversaries may criticize incumbents free from inside censorship. This
broad symmetry is one of the deep insights of Sullivan.20 And so we come
full circle, seeing how the various strands of constitutional argument--
from text, from structure, from history, from precedent--can intertwine to
create a strong rope of constitutional meaning.
17 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689) (Eng.).
18 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V, § 5 (1781).
19 See The American Heritage College Dictionary 994 (3d ed. 1997) ("parliament <
parler, to talk").
20 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964) ("Such a privilege for
criticism of official conduct is appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public
official when he is sued for libel by a private citizen.").
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Having completed our quick summary of various standard arguments
for free expression in America, let us now turn to an intriguing, if often
unnoticed word in the First Amendment: "the." The First Amendment
does not purport to create a new right, but rather to recognize something
pre-existing-apparently, "the" freedom of speech preceded even the First
Amendment. But how? Eighteenth-century English common law did not
recognize a broad right of ordinary Englishmen to upbraid their sovereign
masters in Parliament (though English law did recognize a broad right of
Parliament to malign ordinary Englishmen).21  Nor did the thirteen
colonies, or even the thirteen states in the midst of the Revolutionary War,
officially recognize on the books or invariably respect in practice a right of
free expression as sweeping as would be recognized in later cases such as
Sullivan and Brandenburg.22
I suggest that we can indeed find deep historical roots for the
Sullivan/Brandenburg vision-roots older and deeper even than the First
Amendment. Even before the adoption of the First Amendment,
America's Constitution had already committed itself to an extraordinarily
robust right of citizen speech. The evidence for this right has been hiding
in plain sight for two centuries. What follows is another argument for free
expression-another constitutional "proof," if you will-based on the very
process by which the Constitution itself was in fact ordained and
established by the American people in the late eighteenth century.
II. AN ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL "PROOF": THE ARGUMENT
FROM ENACTMENT
America's Constitution sprang to life through a series of enactments.
In the fateful year following the unveiling of the Philadelphia Convention's
proposed Constitution, citizens across the continent enacted that proposal
into law, much as legislators might enact a statute. Like the words found
in the Constitution, the enactment procedures that gave birth to the
document are rich with meaning. They invite interpretation.
A striking feature of the enactment process has gone largely
unnoticed-or at least untheorized-by modem lawyers, judges, and
scholars. Here is the key fact: Americans in 1787-88 exercised a
remarkably robust, wide-open, virtually uninhibited freedom of political
expression as they pondered the constitutional text proposed by the
Philadelphia framers. The point here is not merely that, as a matter of
21 See AKI-L REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONsTITuTON: A BIOGRAPHY 101-04 (2005).
22 See generally LEONARD W. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
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constitutional structure and logic, American-style popular sovereignty
should be understood to entail a muscular right of citizens to discuss
political ideas and political proposals among themselves. The point is also
that, on this issue, enactment history strongly reinforces logic and
structure. In actual fact, the Constitution was born in a land awash with
speech and through a process that teemed with talk of the freest sort,
including lots of talk harshly critical of existing officials and institutions.
In an extraordinary efflorescence of accusations, addresses, allegories,
analyses, appeals, arguments, assemblies, books, cartoons, complaints,
conversations, costumes, debates, deliberations, denials, diatribes,
disquisitions, effigies, encomiums, essays, exaggerations, flags,
harangues, insults, letters, misstatements, opinions, paintings, pamphlets,
parades, petitions, pleas, poems, prayers, prophesies, puns, quips,
sermons, songs, speeches, squibs, symbols, toasts, and writings of every
sort,23 Americans in the enactment process itself exercised and exemplified
an amazingly vigorous freedom of expression. Sharp-elbowed political
maneuvering there was aplenty; widespread punishment of exuberant
expression there was not.24
Though much of the continental conversation took place prior to the
ratification conventions held in the several states, the conventions
themselves were speech spots par excellence. Assembling outside the
confines of ordinary government institutions, these specially elected,
single-purpose conventions embodied the American people themselves,
with a superior democratic mandate to say yea or nay to the Constitution
than could be claimed by mere state legislatures filled with ordinary
lawmakers elected in the ordinary way.25 Even in conventions where one
side-Federalist or Anti--entered with an apparently decisive majority,
delegates on the other side freely spoke their piece, as a rule. Often, a
speech or argument on a particular issue prompted an apt counterargument.
At times, delegates even pronounced themselves persuaded by something
said by men on the other side. Indeed, as I shall explain a bit more in my
concluding comments, the very ideas that a textual Bill of Rights should be
added to the Philadelphia plan, and that such a textual Bill should
23 See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First
Amendment, 97 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1058 (2009) (discussing the importance and legal
protection in the Founding era of "symbolic expression"-paintings, flags, processions,
liberty poles, costumes, effigies, etc.).
24 This is not to say that the speech situation was perfect. I am indebted to Matt Kelly
for this reminder.
25 See AMAR, supra note 13, at 5-7, 308-12.
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guarantee free citizen expression, gained dramatic momentum in these
ratifying conventions, as moderate Federalists and moderate Anti-
Federalists began to speak, and listen, to each other.
Americans understood what they were doing as they were doing it,
exulting in the luxuriant freedom of expression being acted out before their
eyes and ears by their mouths and hands. 26 America's pre-eminent theorist
of popular sovereignty, the lawyer and later Supreme Court Justice James
Wilson, put it best at the outset of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
before any state had said yes to the Philadelphia plan: "In our
governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in
the people[,] ... [who] possess over our constitutions control in act, as
well as right .... These important truths, sir, are far from being merely
speculative. We, at this moment, speak and deliberate under their
immediate and benign influence., 27 Note Wilson's particular emphasis on
how the enactment process unfolding all around him and his audience was
a system featuring a truly remarkable freedom of ordinary citizens to
"speak and deliberate."
Wilson returned to this enactment theme a week later. America's
sovereign-the people-had "vested certain proportions of... power in
the state governments" but the wellspring of power
continues, resides, and remains, with the body of the
people. Under the practical influence of this great truth,
we are now sitting and deliberating, and under its
operation, we can sit as calmly and deliberate as coolly, in
order to change a constitution, as a legislature can sit and
deliberate under the power of a constitution, in order to
amend a law. 8
With this imagery analogizing the sovereign citizenry at large to a sitting
legislature, Wilson foreshadowed the ultimate text of Amendment I, which,
26 Contemporary foreign observers also took note of the extraordinarily intense and
extensive continental conversation unfolding before them. See, e.g., Letter from Diego de
Gardoqui to Conde de Floridabalanca (Dec. 6, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 205; Letter from Louis-Guillaume Otto to Comte de
Montmorin (Nov. 26, 1787), in 14 id. at 229.
27 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 432 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., William S. Hein & Co 1996)
(1836) (emphasis altered) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
28 Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
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as we have seen, tracks the letter and spirit of Article I's protection of the
"speech" and "debate" of sitting Congressmen.
On this issue, American constitutional theory and practice broke
sharply with English constitutional law A la Blackstone. In England,
Parliament, not the citizenry, was sovereign, and citizens did not in law or
in fact enjoy a broad freedom to criticize incumbent officials or the
government as a whole. As Blackstone explained, English freedom of the
press meant only that printers were free from government licensing
schemes and other sorts of prior restraints and pre-publication censorship.29
If English printers in the late 1780s upbraided powerful men or institutions,
these printers were vulnerable-both in theory and in practice-to post-
publication criminal punishment and civil liability. Across the Atlantic, by
contrast, citizens criticized officials, officialdom, and social institutions
(including slavery, it should be noted) with abandon. In the years between
winning independence and ratifying the Constitution, Americans faced few
legal sanctions that actually operated to limit boisterous political
expression. ° And most important of all for my purposes, this regime of
boisterous political expression was the milieu in which the Constitution
itself was enacted in the remarkable window of 1787-88.
In a famous Virginia tract penned during the Adams administration-a
tract sharply contesting the constitutionality of the infamous Sedition Act
of 1798-James Madison argued that
[t]he practice in America must be entitled to... respect.
In every state, probably, in the Union, the press has
exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures
of public men, of every description, which has not been
confined to the strict limits of [English] common law. On
this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on this
foundation it yet stands ... 31
As an exclamation point to his observations about actual American
practice, Madison reminded his audience that without this robust freedom
of expression, perhaps the Constitution itself would not have come into
being.
29 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 151-52.
30 See LEvY, supra note 22, at 186; David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 510 (1983).
31 James Madison, Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 27, at 570 (emphasis added).
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Had Sedition Acts, forbidding every publication that might
bring the constituted agents into contempt or disrepute, or
that might excite the hatred of the people against the
authors of unjust or pernicious measures, been uniformly
enforced against the press, might not the United States
have been languishing, at this day, under the infirmities of
a sickly Confederation?
32
Though the Philadelphia drafters had incautiously failed to include an
explicit clause affirming a sweeping right of free speech for the American
people, such a right was nonetheless an intrinsic and indispensable, if
unwritten, element of the Constitution as actually enacted. In this context,
let us not forget the language of the Ninth Amendment, which reminds us
that not all the rights of the people require textual enumeration to enjoy
legal validity.33 As prominent members of the First Congress noted in
considering companion language to the Ninth Amendment, certain rights
that the people had recognized "in practice" were thereby "better asserted
than [they could] be by any words whatever."
34
III. A FEW THOUGHTS ON METHOD
Exactly what sort of constitutional argument is this argument from
enactment? I would ultimately classify this argument as a subspecies of
historical argument. However, the argument from enactment history is a
particularly interesting variant of general historical argument, partaking of
some of the strengths more typically associated with textual and structural
argument.
Many standard historical arguments are only loosely connected to the
actual constitutional text. For example, if I inform you-as I indeed
informed just a few pages ago 35-- that several leading Federalists in 1787-
88 said that the Philadelphia plan would not threaten liberty of the press
because Congress had no general enumerated power on this topic, you
might ask if there were other men who said something different. You
might ask how many people in the ratification process actually heard these
Federalist apologists. You might ask how many people were persuaded by
the Federalist argument. You might ask where the Constitution's text
32Id. at 571.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
34 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 741 (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1834); id. at 746.
35 See discussion supra Part II.
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prevents Congress from using those powers that are enumerated-such as
powers to govern the territories and the national seat, to regulate interstate
commerce, and to adopt tax laws-in ways that threaten the press.
By contrast, the argument from enactment offers a tighter, more
intrinsic connection to the Constitution itself. My point is not that free
speech generally prevailed on the ground in post-colonial America. (In
fact, loyalist speech was suppressed during the Revolution itself.36)
Rather, my point is that the very act of constitutional ordainment occurred
in and through a regime of boisterous, virtually uncensored free speech. In
this respect, the argument from enactment history is rather like textual
argument, which also focuses tightly on the Constitution itself. But the
enactment approach understands the Preamble's self-reference to "this
Constitution" as a deed as well as a text-a doing, an ordainment, a
constituting, a performative, "We . . . do" utterance. In short, an
enactment, reflected in the text itself: "We, the People... do ordain and
establish this Constitution." Exactly who did this ordaining/enacting and
how? These are the questions highlighted by the enactment approach.
To put the point a slightly different way, perhaps the enactment
argument can be seen as the ultimate textual argument-an interpretation
of the tiny but all-important workhorse word "do" in the Preamble. The
argument from enactment prompts us to understand what exactly the
people did through the very process of ordaining and establishing the
Constitution. And what was done, I submit, was a remarkable embodiment
of free speech, speech that was inextricably intertwined with the very deed
of ordainment itself.
The argument from enactment history also shares one of the great
strengths of various classic structural arguments: the argument from
enactment history focuses on the Constitution as a whole, rather than on
some clause or part. Whereas many standard textual arguments are small-
bore and clause-bound, the argument from enactment is panoramic,
drawing our attention to how the entire Constitution came into being-and,
indeed, became the supreme law of our land. In this sense, my enactment
argument is the ultimate structural argument, with a historical twist.
IV. CONCLUSION
A few words by way of conclusion about what I have and have not
done in this lecture. I began by promising to say a little something about
constitutional substance and constitutional method. I hope that I have kept
36 See LEvY, supra note 22, at 183-85.
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
my promise. In my early conversations with the organizers of the Sullivan
Lecture, I fear I lapsed into my usual tendency to self-aggrandize: I
boasted that I would present a "new theory" of free expression. Some
people may have come to the lecture hall expecting nothing less. But my
thoughts about free speech are not wholly new; James Wilson and James
Madison said it first. I am simply trying to bring their enactment theory
back into the spotlight where it belongs.
So far as I know, in the vast literature on the right of free expression,
the remarkable statements of Wilson and Madison have never been brought
together for the benefit of modem readers. Nor, in the ocean of books and
articles about free expression, have I ever found so much as a single page
attempting to deduce a right to free speech simply from the actual free-
speech circumstances surrounding the federal Constitution's enactment in
the Great Continental Debate of 1787-88. The statements of Madison that
I have quoted first appeared in a particularly prominent place-the
Virginia Report of 1799. These words were part of a momentous defense
of free expression and came from the pen of the man who himself is widely
viewed as the father of the Constitution and the driving force behind the
Bill of Rights. Yet this part of Madisonia has rarely even been noticed by
modem scholars, much less showcased. In a recent computer search, I
found fewer than a dozen articles from the last quarter century that have
ever quoted, even in passing, any of Madison's key language.37 One of
these articles, I might add, is a very fine essay by Professor Blasi.
38
Most Americans associate the right of free expression with the First
Amendment. It is helpful to remember how that Amendment came to pass.
The original Philadelphia plan had no explicit guarantee of citizen free
speech and no standard Bill of Rights resembling various state
constitutional bills of rights already on the books.39 In the Great National
Debate of 1787-88, Anti-Federalists highlighted this defect. Federalists
37 The scholarly lapse is all the more notable because Madison's words as I have quoted
them appear nearly in full in two of the most significant and most closely analyzed free
expression cases ever decided: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717-18 (1930), and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
38 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 41
n. 142 (2005).
39 For example, Pennsylvania's first constitution, enacted in 1776, contained "A
Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of
Pennsylvania," which included language affirming that "the people have a right to freedom
of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press
ought not to be restrained." PA. CONST. OF 1776, Pt. I, art. XII.
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listened, and some were persuaded. A consensus began to emerge that a
Bill of Rights should indeed be added once the Constitution came into
effect.
The text that we call the Bill of Rights-and the subset of that text that
we call the First Amendment-thus came about precisely as a result of the
epic national conversation that I have tried to emphasize here. Poetically,
the textual guarantee of freedom of speech arose precisely because of the
actual practice of freedom of speech. The textual enactment (the
legislation) of free speech in 1789-91 followed the embodied enactment
(the acting out) of free speech in 1787-88. The textual guarantee itself
harks back to this earlier experience by referring to "the" freedom of
speech and of the press as a pre-existing right that is merely affirmed and
declared-not created-by the First Amendment itself.

